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WHAT DO YOU THINK SHOULD HAPPEN?  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN  
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
Anna Triponel & Stephen Pearson* 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Transitional justice is defined by the United Nations (―UN‖) 
as ―the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society‘s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale 
past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and 
achieve reconciliation.‖1  Most typically it refers to the methods by 
which a state seeks to address major human rights abuses that 
occurred within its borders, often after a transition from a 
tyrannical regime to a democratic one.2  Instead of focusing solely 
upon the accountability of individual perpetrators, as in a 
traditional criminal justice system, transitional justice combines 
the goals of justice for victims with the objectives of peace, 
reconciliation, and social reconstruction.3 
 
* Anna Triponel and Stephen Pearson are dual qualified attorneys (New York 
and England & Wales) with the law firm of Jones Day.  They head the New York 
office‘s International Law Pro Bono Group which advises the Public 
International Law & Policy Group (PILPG), a global pro bono firm providing 
legal assistance to states and governments involved in conflicts.  This includes 
assistance to the Government of Uganda in the implementation of the Juba 
Peace Accords and the design and implementation of domestic mechanisms to 
support war crimes prosecution, truth-telling and reconciliation.  The authors 
would like to thank Linda Azrin, Marlena Crippin, Nicholas Kamphaus and Wei 
Zhang for research assistance.  The views expressed in this article are those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Jones Day or PILPG. 
 1 United Nations Rule of Law, Transnational Justice, 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=29 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 2 See UNITED NATIONS, WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE? A BACKGROUNDER 
(2008), http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%20 
Group%20on%20Lessons%20Learned/Justice%20in%20Times%20of%20Transitio
n%20(26.02.2008)/26.02.2008%20%20Background%20note.pdf. 
 3 See id. 
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States often use a variety of both judicial and non-judicial 
transitional justice mechanisms.4  This article will focus on three 
of these methods.  The first transitional justice method involves 
using high court procedures against individuals who are alleged to 
have committed gross violations of human rights.5  These court 
procedures are aimed at judging only a nominal number of 
defendants: typically those accused of particularly serious crimes.6  
Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and 
courts set up in Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. 
The second method is the use of trial-type procedures based 
on local, traditional justice mechanisms against lower-level 
offenders.7  These procedures are typically integrated into the 
country‘s domestic criminal system and are intended to hold 
accountable those who played a part in the conflict but who did 
not necessarily commit offences that rise to the level of 
international crimes.  Examples include the Gacaca system in 
Rwanda and the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber. 
The third method involves the use of truth and reconciliation 
commissions (―TRCs‖) which are designed to establish a historical 
record of past conflict and enhance reconciliation.8  Unlike the 
first two mechanisms, TRCs are non-judicial bodies which map 
patterns of past human rights abuses.9  Such bodies have been 
established in a number of countries, and have been used either 
 
 4 For more information on transitional justice systems generally, see Oskar 
N.T. Thoms et al., Does Transitional Justice Work? Perspectives from Empirical 
Social Science (Univ. of Ottawa, Working Paper Series, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1302084; see also David E. 
Guinn, Human Rights Education: The Third Leg of Post-Conflict/Transitional 
Justice (Int‘l Human Rights Law Inst., Working Paper Series, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=854488. 
 5 See Thoms et al., supra note 4. 
 6 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: MAXIMIZING THE LEGACY OF 
HYBRID COURTS 18 (2008), http://www.unrol.org/files/Hybrid Courts.pdf 
[hereinafter HYBRID COURTS]. 
 7 See Thoms et al., supra note 4. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Human Rights Council, United Nations, Annual Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner 
and the Secretary-General ¶ 8, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/18 (Aug. 6, 2009). See 
generally PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2001). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
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alone or in conjunction with one or both of the two mechanisms 
referenced above.  In Argentina, Chile and Liberia, TRCs were the 
only transitional justice methods used, whereas in Sierra Leone, 
Timor-Leste and Rwanda, they have been combined with high 
court or trial-type procedures. 
Less frequently used transitional justice mechanisms include 
lustration, which involves excluding officials who have been found 
guilty of committing abuses from public service, monetary 
reparations to victims of past abuses, and reform of state 
institutions.10 
Although the concept of transitional justice has been 
recognized for more than thirty years, in recent times an 
increasing number of countries are taking steps to address the 
legacy of past human rights abuses within their borders, and are 
resorting to transitional justice as a means of doing so.  For 
example, in Burundi, civil war amongst the country‘s ethnic 
groups dating back to 1987 left the country ravaged.11  In 2000, 
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi 
recommended the creation of a Special Tribunal, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and an international judicial 
commission of inquiry for which a number of activities are now 
being launched to raise public awareness.12  In Kenya, a Truth, 
 
 10 See Thoms et al., supra note 4; see also WHAT IS TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE?, 
supra note 2, at 3-4 (defining reparation programs as ―state-sponsored initiatives 
that aim to contribute to repairing, on a massive scale, the material and moral 
consequences of past abuse experienced by certain classes of victims. They 
typically distribute some mix of material and symbolic benefits to victims.‖ 
Defining security system reform as ―wide-ranging programs to transform the 
military, police, judiciary, and related state institutions from instruments of 
repression and corruption into instruments of public service and integrity.‖). 
 11 International Center for Transitional Justice, Burundi, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/512.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) 
[hereinafter Burundi]. 
 12 The Secretary-General, Report of the Assessment Mission On the 
Establishment of an International Judicial Commission of Inquiry for Burundi, 
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2005/158 (Mar. 2005) [hereinafter 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement].  See UN Will Finance Burundi 
Transitional Justice Consultations, http://african 
newsanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/06/un-will-finance-burundi-transitional.html 
(June 22, 2009, 21:13 EST); see also Burundi , supra note 11; United Nations 
Development Programme, Burundi, http://www.bi.undp.org/html/demgover 
nance%20-%2000062255.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010); BBC World Service 
Trust, Communicating Justice, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/ 
whatwedo/where/africa/2008/03/080219_africa_justice_project_overview.shtml 
3
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Justice, and Reconciliation Commission was created following the 
2008 National Dialogue and Reconciliation brokered by the 
African Union‘s Panel of Eminent African Personalities.13  This 
was prompted by the civil unrest which followed the disputed 
presidential election in 2007.  In Uganda, political unrest and 
rebel violence in the north have threatened the country‘s stability 
since the 1980‘s.14  The Uganda Government and the Lord‘s 
Resistance Army in 2008 agreed on the final Annexure on 
Accountability and Reconciliation which provided for the creation 
of a range of transitional justice mechanisms which the 
Government is now in the process of implementing.15  In Nepal, 
the Government recently decided to establish a Disappearances 
Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
response to the civil conflict which gripped the country from 1996 
to 2006.16 
There is also ongoing debate regarding the possibility of 
implementing transitional justice mechanisms in a number of 
other states.  In Sudan, thought is being given as to how to 
promote sustainable peace through post-conflict reconciliation 
mechanisms.17  The international community is discussing the 
 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 13 See International Center  for Transitional Justice, Kenya, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/648.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) 
(detailing the other transitional justice mechanisms that were created);  see also 
Njonjo Mue, Involve the Public in Law-Making, INT‘L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL 
JUST., May 10, 2009, http://ictj.org/en/news/coverage/article/ 2608.html (indicating 
that the Kenyan parliament turned down the Constitutional Amendment Bill for 
a Special Tribunal for post-election violence). 
 14 See generally International Center for Transitional Justice, Uganda, 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Africa/Uganda/ICTJ_UGA_Backgrounder_wb2008.pdf 
[hereinafter Uganda]. 
 15 SCOTT WORDEN, U.S. INST. PEACE, THE JUSTICE DILEMMA IN UGANDA 1 
(2008), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/1_3.PDF; see also generally Uganda, 
supra note 14. 
 16 See generally Nepal: Send Human Rights Bill to Parliament, H.R. WATCH, 
Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/29/nepal-send-human-rights-
bills-parliament [hereinafter Nepal: Human Rights Bill]; USIPIECE BRIEFING, 
U.S. INST. PEACE, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NEPAL: A LOOK AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 1-10 (2007), 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/transitional_justice_nepal.pdf [hereinafter 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NEPAL]; International Center for Transitional Justice, 
Nepal,  http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/1684.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2010). 
 17 CONCORDIS INTERNATIONAL, PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SUDAN 
THROUGH POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION (2007), http://www. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
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possibility of implementing transitional justice mechanisms in 
Zimbabwe at some point in the future,18 while in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the international community is analyzing how 
the transitional justice mechanisms which were implemented 
there could have been more effective and credible.19  In recent 
years, there has been interest in setting up a truth commission in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Philippines and 
Venezuela.20 
One factor that is considered increasingly important in the 
success of transitional justice systems is early consultation with 
the population about the proposed system.  The international 
community now generally refers to the benefits of public 
participation during the planning phase as a ―given.‖21  
Meaningful participation involves integrating feedback received 
from the public into the transitional justice mechanism, as 
opposed to outreach which focuses on educating the public.  For 
example, in Burundi, the UN recommended that there ―be a 
broad-based, genuine and transparent process of consultation . . . 
with a range of national actors and civil society at large, to ensure 
that, within the general legal framework for the establishment of 
judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms acceptable to 
the United Nations and the Government [of Burundi], the views 
and wishes of the people of Burundi are taken into account.‖22  In 
Nepal, non-governmental organizations (―NGOs‖) including 
 
concordis-international.org/files/PCJR%20Summary.pdf. 
 18 See, e.g., ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM, EXPLORING TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE OPTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY ZIMBABWE (2006), 
http://www.hrforumzim.com/special_hrru/transitional_justice.pdf; see also 
Pondai Bamu, Zimbabwe: Transitional Justice Without Transition in Zimbabwe, 
ALLAFRICA.COM, Feb. 26, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902 270233.html. 
 19 International Center for Transitional Justice, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/646.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 20 MINISTRY OF NEPAL PEACE SECRETARIAT, WORLDWIDE TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS, http://www.peace.gov.np/admin/doc/World%20 
experiances%20of%20TRC-Commissions.pdf. 
 21 See, e.g., Transitional Justice, supra note 1 (indicating that ―[n]ational 
consultations are a critical element as successful transitional justice programmes 
necessitate meaningful public participation, particularly of victims.‖); UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE OF HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 3 (2008), 
http://www.nhri.net/2009/NHRIs_Guidance %20Note%20TJ_Oct%2008.pdf. 
 22 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, supra note 12, ¶ 75. 
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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have urged the 
government ―to involve actively all those concerned in the 
discussions on the establishment, mandate, and powers of the 
Disappearances Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.‖23  Furthermore, surveys conducted in countries 
setting up transitional justice mechanisms, demonstrate that ―the 
legitimacy of a tribunal may be intimately connected with public 
perceptions of its work.‖24  In a 2004 report on the use of 
transitional justice in post-conflict societies, the UN Secretary-
General indicated that the past decade has shown that 
maintenance of peace in the long term ―cannot be achieved unless 
the population is confident that redress for grievances can be 
obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and the fair administration of justice.‖25 
An analysis of public participation in the planning phases of 
transitional justice mechanisms which have already been 
implemented therefore provides useful guidance to states which 
are currently implementing these procedures.  To set the stage, 
this article first tracks the evolution of transitional justice 
mechanisms over the past twenty years, highlighting a gradual 
increase in national involvement in the nascent stages of 
transitional justice, as well as a more pronounced focus on 
reconciliation (Part I).  This article then discusses the emerging 
trend towards promoting early public participation in transitional 
justice systems.  The analysis demonstrates that public 
participation during the creation of the transitional justice system 
paves the way for increased public participation throughout its 
period of operation (Part II).  In turn, these evolutionary trends 
assist in developing a nascent set of best practices, which 
 
 23 Nepal: Human Rights Bill, supra note 16.  See also TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
IN NEPAL, supra note 16, at 1-10. 
 24 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 18 (referring to ICTJ and Human Rights 
Center, University of California, Berkeley, Forgotten Voices: A Population-Based 
Survey on Attitudes about Peace and Justice in Northern Uganda (July 2005), 
and The Post-conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and 
Empowerment and ICTJ, Ex combatant Views of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone (Sept. 2002) (indicating that 
―surveys conducted in Rwanda, Uganda and Sierra Leone have illustrated a close 
relationship between knowing about a court and supporting it.‖). 
 25 The Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 3, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Transitional Justice Report]. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
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countries emerging from conflict, such as Nepal, Uganda and 
Kenya, can consult as they strive to achieve justice with 
reconciliation (Part III). 
I. THREE WAVES OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
An analysis of the transitional justice mechanisms used since 
the concept was first recognized highlight three distinctive waves 
of transitional justice, ranging from the 1980s (where local TRCs 
were used almost exclusively), to the 1990s (where international 
involvement was accentuated), to the 2000s (where transitional 
justice focused increasingly on national ownership and 
reconciliation). 
A. The 1980s: Localized TRCs as the Single Component of 
Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice, as the term is understood today, emerged 
in the 1980s in response to political changes in countries 
throughout Latin America.26  These conflicts gave rise to the 
concept of TRCs as the key component of transitional justice.  For 
example, in 1983, Argentinean President, Raul Alfonsín, created a 
TRC - the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons 
(―CONADEP‖) - to address the abuses of the successive military 
juntas that had ruled Argentina since 1976.27  Similarly, Chilean 
President, Patricio Aylwin, created a TRC in 1990 - the National 
 
 26 International Center for Transitional Justice, Mission and History, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/about/mission/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) 
(indicating that ―[w]hat became known as transitional justice emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s mainly in response to political changes in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe -- and to demands in these regions for justice.‖). 
 27 Isabel Perón was deposed in a coup d‘état in Argentina in 1976 and was 
replaced by a military government known as the ―National Reorganization 
Process‖ (the ―Proceso de Reorganización Nacional‖).  Although it is unclear 
precisely when the humanitarian crisis began, the military coup sparked a 
process of political subversion in which thousands of Argentineans disappeared.   
It was later learned that these Argentineans were, in many cases, transferred to 
secret detention centers and summarily executed by the Argentine military.  In 
October 1983, elections were held to restore Argentina to civilian democratic rule 
and the National Reorganization Process leaders were voted out of power.  For 
more information, see NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, ARGENTINE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON DISAPPEARED (1984), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031013222855/nuncamas.org/english/library/nevag
ain/nevagain_005.htm. 
7
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Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, also known as the 
Rettig Commission – to address the human rights abuses that had 
taken place in Chile at the hands of the military junta since 
1973.28 
The objective of these early TRCs was to document the events 
that had taken place and the crimes that had been committed, 
without seeking to determine responsibility.  CONADEP‘s 
mandate, for example, was to investigate the disappearance of 
people during a specific time frame (between 1976 and 1983).29  
Similarly, the Chilean National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation‘s aim was to develop a complete picture of human 
rights violations under the Pinochet regime and recommend 
appropriate legal and administrative measures to prevent future 
repetition.30 
B. The 1990s: Increased International Involvement 
The second wave of transitional justice in the 1990s is 
characterized by increased international involvement in the 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms.  In Eastern 
Europe and Africa, the international community intervened to set 
up tribunals to judge those responsible for crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.  The Balkans 
conflict31 led to the creation of an international criminal tribunal 
 
 28 In 1973, the military in Chile took power from President Salvador 
Allende.  Thereafter, the military ruled by means of a junta, dominated by 
Augusto Pinochet.  The junta committed numerous human rights abuses while in 
power, including torture and the summary execution of political dissidents.  
When the military was forced to give in to public support for democratic rule in 
1990, President Aylwin was elected on a campaign promise to hold accountable 
those who were responsible.  See generally MARK ENSALACO, CHILE UNDER 
PINOCHET: RECOVERING THE TRUTH 182-83 (2000) (discussing the history of war 
and human rights in Chile). 
 29 Argentine National Commission on Disappeared, Nunca Màs, 
http://www.nuncamas.org/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_000.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010).  See United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: 
Argentina, http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-argentina (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Truth Commission: Argentina]. 
 30 Eric Brahm, The Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY, July 2005, http://www.beyondintractability.orgcase_ 
studies/Chilean_Truth_Commission.jsp?nid=5221. 
 31 In the early 1990s, several of Yugoslavia‘s regions declared independence 
and fighting began along religious and ethnic lines.  As the fighting intensified, 
the various factions began to commit human rights violations, including torture, 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
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by the United Nations Security Council - the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (―ICTY‖) - to 
prosecute those responsible for gross human rights violations.32  
Similarly, in the wake of the Rwandan genocide,33 the UN 
Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (―ICTR‖) to prosecute individuals responsible for the 
crimes committed during the genocide.34 
The increased international involvement in this second wave 
was also seen in the rise of TRCs whose creation was mandated by 
the international community, largely through UN brokered peace 
agreements.  In El Salvador, the 1991 peace agreement brokered 
by the UN, contained provisions creating the Commission on the 
Truth for El Salvador (Comisión de la Verdad Para El Salvador, 
CVES) made up of three international commissioners appointed 
by the Secretary-General of the UN. 35  Guatemala also followed a 
similar path.  Its commission for historical clarification was 
created as part of the UN brokered peace agreement of 1996.36  
 
mutilation, and rape, continuing from approximately the middle of 1991, until at 
least the Dayton Peace Accord was signed on December 14, 1995.  See generally 
HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 124-37 (1999). 
 32 S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 33 In October 1990, a Rwandan exile group composed mostly of ethnic Tutsis 
invaded Rwanda against the Hutu government.  The war continued for 
approximately two years until the government and the rebels reached a peace 
accord in Arusha, Tanzania.  On April 6, 1994, the Hutu president, 
Habyarimana, died when his airplane was shot down.  In the next three months 
(April 6, 1994 to mid-July 1994), Hutu militia groups killed up to one million 
ethnic Tutsis and Hutu moderates, and another two million became refugees.  
United States Department of State, Background Note: Rwanda, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2861.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010). 
 34 Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca courts in Rwanda, in The Gacaca Traditional 
Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, in Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation After Violent Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 45 (Luc Huyse et al. eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Tradit 
ional_Justice_and_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf. 
 35 EL SALVADOR: MEXICO PEACE AGREEMENTS—PROVISIONS CREATING THE 
COMMISSIONS ON TRUTH (1991), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, at 174-79, available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/El%20Salva dor-
Charter.pdf; United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: El Salvador, 
http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-el-salvador (last visited Jan. 30, 
2010). 
 36 United States Institute of Peace, Truth Commission: Guatemala, 
http://www.usip.org/resources/truth-commission-guatemala (last visited Jan. 31, 
9
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The chair of the commission was German and was selected by the 
UN Secretary General.  While there were two members on the 
Commission who were Guatemalan, the institution was heavily 
influenced by the UN and thus highly internationalized.37 
C. The 21st Century: A Renewed Focus on National Ownership 
and Reconciliation 
The third wave of transitional justice is characterized by (i) a 
renewed focus on national rather than solely international 
involvement in the transitional justice process and (ii) the birth of 
hybrid tribunals.  Hybrid courts are ―courts of mixed composition 
and jurisdiction, encompassing both national and international 
aspects, usually operating within the jurisdiction where the 
crimes occurred.‖38  Unlike the international ad hoc tribunals 
created in the early 1990s, these new hybrid courts held trials in 
their own countries, involved an increasing number of nationals 
within their operations, and used both national and international 
law concepts.39  This renewed focus on national ownership is 
reflected in the general consensus reached by the international 
community in 1998 that countries should be able to prosecute 
those responsible for gross human rights abuses within their 
borders under the principle of complementarity, rather than being 
required to submit to an over-reaching international criminal 
court.40  At the same time, a number of local TRCs aimed at 
promoting reconciliation, were created to complement these 
judicial proceedings. 
The example of Sierra Leone demonstrates this third wave of 
transitional justice.  In Sierra Leone, the 1999 Lomé Accord called 
for the establishment of a TRC which commenced its operations in 
 
2010) [hereinafter Truth Commission: Guatemala]; U.S. INST. PEACE, 
COMMISSION FOR HISTORICAL CLARIFICATION: CHARTER (June 23, 1994), 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/Guatemala-
Charter.pdf. 
 37 See Truth Commission: Guatemala, supra note 36. 
 38 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 1. 
 39 See Transitional Justice Report, supra note 25, at 15; HYBRID COURTS, 
supra note 6, at 1. 
 40 See Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court art. 17, § 1(b), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (stating that the International Criminal Court will be 
able to assert jurisdiction if the country is unwilling or unable to prosecute). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
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late 2002.41  Following repeated violation of the Lomé Accord by 
the Revolutionary United Front, the Government of Sierra Leone 
asked the United Nations to help establish a court, in addition to 
the TRC, to prosecute those ―who ‗bear the greatest responsibility‘ 
for the commission of violations of international humanitarian 
law.‖42  Unlike the ICTR and ICTY, which were established by UN 
Security Council Resolutions, the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(the ―Special Court‖) was established by international agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone.43  The Special Court, which used both international and 
national judges and applied both international and national law, 
was a prototype for the hybrid courts that would emerge in the 
future.44 
Similarly, in Timor-Leste, both a TRC and a hybrid court 
were set up as a means for achieving transitional justice after the 
period of Indonesian control of Timor-Leste.45  In June 2000, the 
 
 41 See generally United States Department of State, Background Notes, 
Sierra Leone (2009) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm (discussing that 
the Sierra Leone civil war started in 1991 when a small group known as the 
Revolutionary United Front (―RUF‖), led by Foday Sankoh, invaded Sierra Leone 
from Liberia.  Except for a few short-lived cease-fires and a democratic election, 
Sierra Leone was engulfed by anarchy and violence.  In July 1999, a peace 
agreement was reached by the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF in 
Lomé, Togo (The Lomé Accord), although fighting continued until January 2002, 
when President Ahmad Kabbah declared that the civil war was officially over. 
The Sierra Leone TRC subsequently commenced its operation in late 2002.). 
 42 Joe A.D. Alie, Reconciliation and Traditional Justice: Tradition-Based 
Practices of the Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE AND 
RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT, LEARNING FROM AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 
123, 132 (Luc Huyse & Mark Salter eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.idea.int/publications/traditional_justice/upload/Traditional_Justice_a
nd_Reconciliation_after_Violent_Conflict.pdf. 
 43 Tom Perriello & Marieke Wierda, The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Under Scrutiny, in INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES 13 (2006), available at 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf (indicating that these 
meetings included police and prison authorities, members of the Bar 
Associations, representatives of civil society, and human rights NGOs). 
 44 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISOR ON AFRICA, DDR AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 33 (2007), http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/speeches/ 
ddr%20and%20tj%20in%20africa%20-%20english.pdf [hereinafter OSAA]. 
 45 See generally TAINA JÄRVINEN, FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN EAST TIMOR 
(2004), available at http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/RESSpecNet/ 
19246/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/AE3FEC46-96CC-44B1-BEC5-
AFB8DE4332CD/en/WP47_2.pdf (discussing that nine days after Timor-Leste 
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UN Transitional Authority for East Timor (―UNTAET‖) 
established a hybrid court called the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes (the ―Special Panels‖) to prosecute the most serious 
human rights violations that had taken place in Timor-Leste.46  
This hybrid tribunal was formed during the creation of the overall 
judicial system in Timor-Leste, with each Special Panel consisting 
of one Timorese judge and two international judges.47  The law 
applied by the tribunal mirrored the rules applied by the 
International Criminal Court with a few exceptions.48  Within a 
year, on July 13, 2001, the UNTAET also established a 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de 
Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste, ―CAVR‖) 
charged with creating a mechanism for community reconciliation 
procedures and drafting a final report detailing the truth about 
the human rights violations that took place.49  While the TRC was 
mandated by the UN, local participation was vital.  The 
commission was composed of seven commissioners, all East 
Timorese nationals, and twenty-five to thirty regional 
commissioners located throughout the country.50  Traditional 
justice mechanisms were also incorporated.51 
Cambodia is also home to a hybrid tribunal, the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (―ECCC‖).  In 
 
declared its independence from Portuguese rule on November 28, 1975, 
Indonesia invaded it and took control.  Timor-Leste was under Indonesian rule 
for approximately 25 years, and during that time, a large number of human 
rights violations occurred.  These violent acts reached a crescendo when Timor-
Leste held a referendum on self-government.  The United Nations established 
the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (―UNTAET‖) and 
immediately began to work with the Timorese to establish transitional justice 
mechanisms.). 
 46 See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, 4 (Mar. 6, 2000), available at 
http://secint50.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg11.pdf; see also JÄRVINEN, supra 
note 45, at 48-50. 
 47 See UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/11, supra note 46; JÄRVINEN, supra note 45, 
at 50. 
 48 Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East 
Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245, 245-78 (2003). 
 49 See EAST TIMOR COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION, 
CHEGA! FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR, pts. 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.cavr-
timorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/02-The-Mandate-of-the-
Commission.pdf [hereinafter CHEGA! FINAL REPORT]. 
 50 See CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, intro., paras. 52-54. 
 51 See CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, pt. 9, at 2. 
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1997, the Cambodian Government asked the UN to assist them in 
setting up a tribunal to prosecute senior members of the Khmer 
Rouge for war crimes committed in Cambodia between 1975 and 
1979.52  Although the UN‘s participation was required because of 
the ―weakness of the Cambodian legal system and the 
international nature of the crimes,‖ the Cambodian Government 
wanted to keep the process a national one and insisted that the 
―trial . . . be held in Cambodia using Cambodian staff and judges 
together with foreign personnel.‖53  Therefore, the lengthy 
negotiations between the Cambodian Government and the UN 
resulted in a hybrid court applying a mixture of local and 
international law with both local and international judges and 
prosecutors.54 
At around the same time, the international ad hoc tribunals 
set up for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, were complemented by other 
transitional justice mechanisms aimed at increasing national 
ownership.  The Rwandan Government modernized the Gacaca 
court system, a traditional grassroots dispute settlement 
mechanism, to deal with genocide-related crimes.55  In addition, a 
TRC - the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
(―NURC‖) - was created in 1999.56  In Yugoslavia, there was also a 
push for local involvement, and in 2005, the War Crimes Chamber 
 
 52 Between 1975 and 1979, the Khmer Rouge, a communist party, ruled 
Cambodia.  During this time, the government committed gross human rights 
violations, including torture, mass killings, and the plundering of villages.  The 
Khmer Rouge army was finally overthrown in 1979 by the neighboring 
Vietnamese army.  After obtaining independence from Vietnamese influence in 
1991, Cambodia nominally converted to democratic rule, with the first president 
being overthrown in a coup and the second president remaining in office to the 
present time.  Negotiations with the UN on the creation of a tribunal to put 
Khmer Rouge members on trial for war crimes committed in Cambodia between 
1975 and 1979 commenced in 1997 and resulted in the creation of the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2003.  See 
generally CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM CAMBODIAN 
GENOCIDE 7-8 (2005); Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
Introduction to the ECCC, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/ english/about_eccc.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010) [hereinafter ECCC Cambodia]. 
 53 ECCC Cambodia, supra note 52. 
 54 See International Center for Transitional Justice, Cambodia, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region3/642.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010) 
[hereinafter ICTJ, Cambodia]. 
 55 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 37 (indicating also, id. at 45, that the Gacaca 
court system is the main transitional justice mechanism). 
 56 Id. at 45. 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina was created to try suspects of lower to 
mid-level ranks transferred from the ICTY by the UN Security 
Council.57  One of the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber‘s specific 
objectives was to ―promote the process of reconciliation in Bosnia 
by bringing war criminals to justice.‖58  It therefore complemented 
the ICTY with trials focusing on lower-level offenders which were 
fully integrated into the domestic Bosnian legal system.59 
II. ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC OUTREACH MECHANISMS 
Public participation in transitional justice mechanisms has 
historically differed depending on the mechanism adopted.  The 
trend has been one of increased public outreach with each new 
transitional justice wave. 
A. First Wave: TRCs 
The early TRCs were created by national governments 
without extensive input from the public.  Governments instead 
relied on an implicit mandate from the people, as was the case in 
Argentina and Chile.  In Argentina, President Alfonsín 
campaigned on the promise to address the abuses of the 
successive military juntas that had ruled since 1976.60  Alfonsín 
was elected on December 10, 1983, and just three days after 
assuming office, passed a law requiring the prosecution of military 
leaders who had perpetrated various crimes, especially those 
relating to forced disappearances.61  Two days later, Alfonsín 
 
 57 See TRIAL: Track Impunity Always, Tribunals, War Crimes Chamber in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, http://www.trial-ch.org/en/tribunals/war-crimes-chamber-
in-bosnia-herzegovina.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 58 Id. 
 59 BOGDAN IVANISEVIC ́, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM HYBRID TO 
DOMESTIC COURT (2008), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/ 
content/1/0/1088.pdf. See also TRIAL, supra note 57. 
 60 See Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put 
Into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2622-23 (1991); see also 
Juan Carlos Torre & Liliana de Riz, Argentina Since 1946, in ARGENTINA SINCE 
INDEPENDENCE 342-44 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1993); Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen 
Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 597, 
615 (1994). 
 61 Law No. 158, Dec. 13, 1983, [25321] B.O. (Arg.). 
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passed a law establishing a truth commission, CONADEP.62 
President Alfonsìn had informal consultations regarding the 
establishment of a TRC with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo 
(Mothers of the Disappeared, the ―Madres‖), a large Argentinean 
NGO seeking justice for the abuses committed by the previous 
military governments in Argentina.63  The Madres de la Plaza de 
Mayo did not support the dual system Alfonsín suggested, which 
would have prosecuted high-level offenders in the national courts 
and established a more far-reaching truth commission without the 
power to punish.  The Madres lobbied instead for a commission 
with more power.64  In the end, however, this position was not 
followed.  CONADEP was formed to investigate the 
disappearances of people between 1976 and 1983 and to turn over 
its findings to initiate formal proceedings where necessary.65  The 
methods it used for fact gathering were laid out in a decree which 
resulted from closed-door interviews and no public hearings.66  
CONADEP‘s focus was mostly on investigation as opposed to 
reconciliation, resulting in the report - ―Nunca Mas‖ (Never 
Again) - detailing the facts surrounding the disappearance of 
civilians in Argentina and suggesting recommendations for the 
Government.67 
In Chile, President Aylwin was elected on campaign pledges 
to hold Augusto Pinochet‘s military regime accountable for its 
human rights abuses.  On April 25, 1990, after only one month in 
office, Aylwin created the National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation.68  This commission was created by executive 
decree, in part to avoid a fight with the military, over which 
Pinochet still had control and which wielded considerable power.69  
 
 62 Law No. 187, Dec. 15, 1983, [XLIV-A] A.D.L.A. 137 (Arg.). 
 63 PAUL H. LEWIS, GUERRILLAS AND GENERALS: THE ―DIRTY WAR‖ IN 
ARGENTINA 204 (2002). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Truth Commission: Argentina, supra note 29. 
 66 NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, supra note 27, § IV; Law No.187, Dec. 15, 1983; 
Truth Commission: Argentina, supra note 29; Nino, supra note 60, at 2623. 
 67 NUNCA MÀS: THE REPORT, supra note 27, § I.B. 
 68 See Elizabeth Lira, Human Rights in Chile: The Long Road to Truth, 
Justice, and Reparations, in AFTER PINOCHET: THE CHILEAN ROAD TO DEMOCRACY 
AND THE MARKET 5-6 (Silvia Borzuzky & Lois Hecht Oppenheim eds., 2006); 
ENSALACO, supra note 28; Ministry of the Interior Decree No. 355, Apr. 25, 1990 
(Chile). 
 69 ENSALACO, supra note 28, at 182-83. 
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President Aylwin consulted with the public on the creation of this 
commission, although the extent of public input is debated.70 
 
B. Second Wave: Internationally Mandated High Courts and TRCs 
International actors during the second wave of transitional 
justice helped bring legitimacy to newly formed organizations and 
assisted in the application of internationally recognized 
standards, but in so doing, provided minimal mechanisms for 
public input in the process. 
1. High Courts 
High courts have usually been created by the UN, either 
alone or in collaboration with the concerned state.  The history of 
these high courts highlights that they were often established 
without seeking the public‘s views on whether such a body should 
be created, which is explained in part by the circumstances 
surrounding their creation. 
The UN Security Council unilaterally established the ICTR in 
November 1994, just four months after the end of the violent 
conflict in Rwanda.71  The Security Council did not consult the 
Rwandan public on the establishment of the ICTR and for a 
number of years after its creation, the ICTR had few outreach 
programs directed towards the Rwandan public.72  As a result, the 
 
 70 Id. at 183 (claiming there was not much input outside of Aylwin‘s 
advisors).  But see José Zalaquett, Introduction to the English Edition, in UNITED 
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 6 (2002), available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-
Report/Chile90-Report.pdf  (claiming that ―[d]uring the presidential campaign 
the coalition of parties from the center and center-left which supported the 
Aylwin candidacy set up a commission to prepare policy recommendations on 
human rights. Immediately after inauguration, President Aylwin engaged in 
consultations with human rights activists, relatives of victims of human rights 
violations, religious leaders, and representatives from a broad range of political 
parties. Defining a policy involved first establishing ultimate objectives.‖). 
 71 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. DOC. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  See also International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, General Information, 
http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (follow ―About the Tribunal‖ hyperlink; then follow 
―General Information‖ hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
 72 Mariana Goetz, The International Criminal Court and its Relevance to 
Affected Communities, in COURTING CONFLICT, JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN 
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victims of the Rwandan genocide had no formal venues to express 
their concerns and no program was in place to inform these 
victims of the trial proceedings that were being conducted.73 
In similar fashion, the UN Security Council created the ICTY 
unilaterally in February 1993 while hostilities were ongoing.74  
The Dayton Peace Accord, which ended the conflict in Yugoslavia, 
was only signed two years after the creation of the ICTY.75  As a 
result, public outreach regarding these international tribunals 
only started after they had been created.76 
2. Internationally Mandated TRCs 
TRCs during the first wave were usually created pursuant to 
a peace agreement among all parties to the conflict and, similarly, 
did not call for extensive public consultation. 
In Guatemala, the Historical Clarification Commission, 
established through a UN peace agreement, was a product of 
negotiations between the Guatemalan Government, the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca General Command, and 
the UN.77  The opportunity for public input in the early phases of 
TRC development was minimal as the public was not given a 
choice on whether a TRC should exist and what it should look 
like.  This lack of public input is said to have had a negative effect 
on the efficacy of the TRC.  For example, while the report issued 
by the commission found that 83% of the victims were Mayans, 
most of the outreach programs launched by the commission were 
in Spanish rather than in the indigenous languages of the 
 
AFRICA 65 (Nicholas Waddell et al. eds., 2008). 
 73 Id. at 65. 
 74 See PIERRE HAZAN, JUSTICE IN A TIME OF WAR: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 7-25 (James 
Thomas Snyder trans., Texas A&M Univ. Press 2004). 
 75 BALL, supra note 31, at 137. 
 76 For example, the ICTR started its first outreach program in 2000, nearly 
six years after its establishment, by opening an ―info point‖ in Kigali where the 
trial information is publicly accessible. The Tribunal also sought to develop a 
Kinyarwanda (Rwanda‘s national language) section of its website and to 
translate key decisions into Kinyarwanda.  Goetz, supra note 72, at 65-66 
(indicating also that these outreach programs are limited by their voluntary 
financing and perceived status as non-core functions of the ICTR). 
 77 Conciliation Resources, Commission for Historical Clarification Accord, 
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/historical-clarification. php (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
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Mayans.78 
El Salvador‘s truth commission was also established through 
a UN brokered peace agreement.  The TRC was administered and 
funded by UN member states and was charged with investigating 
―serious acts of violence that occurred since 1980 whose impact on 
society urgently demands that the public . . . know the truth.‖79  
The lack of public discussions in establishing the TRC added to its 
lack of credibility, and five days after the TRC issued its report 
and recommendations, the Government granted a blanket 
amnesty covering the violent events taking place in this period.80 
C. Third Wave: Hybrid Courts, Traditional Justice and TRCs 
The third wave of transitional justice witnessed a shift 
towards increased national ownership of the transitional justice 
mechanisms used, with continued reliance on international 
standards of justice.  The focus shifted from high courts to hybrid 
court and traditional justice systems, and from internationally 
influenced TRCs to more locally dominated ones. 
1. Hybrid Courts 
Similar to the high courts that were created during the 
second wave of transitional justice, the first created hybrid 
tribunals lacked public participation mechanisms.  In Timor-
Leste, the UNTAET created the Special Panels on June 6, 2000 
without consulting the public.81  One NGO, the Judicial System 
 
 78 Justice in Perspective, Commission for Historical Clarification, 
http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=67&Itemid=142 (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
 79 De la Locura a La Esperanza: La Guerra de 12 Años en El Salvador, 
http://www.fundacionpdh.org/lesahumanidad/informes/elsalvador/informe-de-la-
locura-a-la-esperanza.htm; Commission for Historical Clarification, supra note 
78. 
 80 Justice in Perspective, Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, 
http://www.justiceinperspective.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie
w&id=65&Itemid=111 (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
 81 U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor, U.N. DOC. 
UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000). See HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 10 
(where the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
states that ―virtually no consultation with local legal actors or the public 
preceded the decisions to insert international actors into the domestic legal 
system reflected in . . . UNTAET Regulation N° 2000/15‖); see also Suzannah 
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Monitoring Programme, provided some public information 
regarding the Special Panels, but a system for soliciting feedback 
from the general population was not provided for from the 
outset.82 
The general transition to hybrid tribunals which occurred at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, was 
accompanied by a gradual shift in thinking.  During the 2000‘s, 
the UN demonstrated an increased readiness to consult with the 
public in a specified state before determining the exact contours of 
the post-conflict justice system to be adopted in that state.  The 
ability to gather public input also became simpler because courts 
were no longer being established while conflict was raging.  In 
Sierra Leone, a peace agreement was signed on July 7, 1999, 
followed by a UN planning mission which held meetings with 
representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs on 
January 7-19, 2002, resulting in the signature of the agreement 
establishing the Special Court on January 16, 2002.83  In 
Cambodia, the UN also held consultations with civil society 
groups while it was negotiating with the Cambodian Government 
on the structure of the court to be established.84 
Although these public consultations are to be commended, 
their actual impact on the creation and format of these courts has 
been questioned.  For example, in Sierra Leone, the negotiations 
to establish the Special Court for Sierra Leone included mainly 
Government actors led by the Attorney-General and the Minister 
of Justice.85  Many national groups felt ignored,86 leading the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to conclude that ―the lack 
of involvement of Sierra Leonean legal professionals more broadly 
 
Linton, Rising From the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System 
in East Timor, 15 MELB. U. L. REV. 122 (2001). 
 82 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (indicating also that in ―Timor-Leste, 
the Special Panels similarly did not initially engage in any form of public 
outreach or even dissemination of basic information, in contrast to the Serious 
Crimes Unit.‖). 
 83 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 17 (indicating that these meetings 
included police and prison authorities, members of the Bar Associations, 
representatives of civil society, and human rights NGOs). 
 84 KELLI MUDDELL, THE ASIA SOCIETY, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CAMBODIA: 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 6-7 (2003), http://www.ictj.org/ static/ 
Asia/Cambodia/cambodiasymposium.eng.pdf. 
 85 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11. 
 86 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 13. 
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and the failure to keep them adequately informed of progress 
meant that, firstly, lawyers felt disengaged from the process and, 
secondly, a lack of information led to misplaced hopes and 
expectations.‖87  Similarly, in Cambodia, civil society groups 
complained that the UN consultations tended to be limited to 
educational sessions, and that no system for obtaining feedback 
from these groups was put into place.88 
Rather than seeking feedback on whether and how a hybrid 
court should be created, establishers of these courts have most 
commonly focused on educating the public about the relevant 
court.  In Cambodia, spokespeople for the court gave interviews to 
the press about how the court would work and, in conjunction 
with the Documentation Center of Cambodia (the ―DC-Cam‖), the 
court invited villagers from throughout Cambodia to visit the 
court and learn about its workings.89  The UN also kept civil 
society groups informed of the status of the negotiations regarding 
the creation of the court through regular meetings with 
representatives from various groups.90 
There have also been more targeted efforts to educate local 
leaders and ex-combatants on the premise that these sub-groups 
will in turn help to educate the public at large.  In Sierra Leone, 
one national NGO, the Special Court Working Group, had a 
consistent presence on local radio and educated local leaders 
about the Special Court.91  Another national NGO, the Post-
Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and 
Empowerment, in coordination with the International Center for 
Transitional Justice (the ―ICTJ‖), conducted surveys and 
 
 87 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11. 
 88 MUDDELL, supra note 84. 
 89 See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Outreach & 
Media, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/outreach.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).  
These activities continued once the judges were selected and the court began 
preliminary operations.  DC-Cam worked closely with the ECCC to help further 
the truth telling and reconciliation goals of the special tribunal.  The DC-Cam 
distributed monthly journals, free of charge, with trial updates and other 
relevant articles. See Peter Bartu & Neil Wilford, DDR and Transitional Justice: 
Cambodia Case Study, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, 
http://ictj.org/en/research/projects/ddr/country-cases/ 2378.html. 
 90 MUDDELL, supra note 84, at 7-11 (indicating also that Cambodian NGOs 
complained however that their involvement was limited to receiving information 
and would have liked to play a larger role in the court‘s creation). 
 91 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 35. 
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organized sensitization and focus group sessions with ex-
combatants to educate them about the transitional justice 
systems.92  These sensitization sessions were said to have greatly 
increased the ex-combatants‘ support for the Special Court and 
their willingness to cooperate with this court.93  National NGOs 
led most of the educational efforts before the Special Court was 
established because local groups were concerned about animosity 
or retaliation from the ex-combatants.94  The Special Court‘s 
official outreach program, however, did not start until more than 
six months after the court started its operations.95 
2. Traditional Justice Systems 
Traditional justice systems are increasingly viewed as an 
integral mechanism through which transitional justice can take 
place.  Rwanda has established a full transitional justice system 
based on a traditional justice mechanism, the Gacaca system.  
Timor-Leste incorporated aspects of traditional justice into its 
community reconciliation procedures and the Bosnian War 
Crimes Chamber is a traditional justice system integrated into 
the local court system. 
In Rwanda public participation was vital to the success of the 
Gacaca system.  Public input was sought at every step of the 
process, and the feedback was used to improve and streamline the 
final traditional justice system seen in the country now.  Before 
the Gacaca courts were adopted as a nation-wide traditional 
justice mechanism, local researchers and professors in Rwanda 
had demonstrated that the Gacaca courts were being used in some 
areas immediately after the genocide, initiated either by the local 
people or the local authorities.96  The findings of this research 
were discussed in a 1996 report by the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (the ―UNHCHR‖) which recommended the use of 
 
 92 POST-CONFLICT REINTEGRATION INITIATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT & 
EMPOWERMENT, EX-COMBATANT VIEWS OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE 36-39 (2002), 
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/0/9/090.pdf [hereinafter PRIDE].  Perriello & 
Wierda, supra note 43, at 36. 
 93 PRIDE, supra note 92, at 16-17. 
 94 Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 35. 
 95 Id. at 36-37 (discussing the outreach efforts by the Special Court). 
 96 Ingelaere, supra note 34. 
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Gacaca to deal with genocide-related crimes.97  Between May 1998 
and March 1999, the then-Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu 
held weekly discussions (the Urugwiro Meetings) with 
representatives of Rwandan society about serious social issues, 
including the genocide-related crimes and the possible use of 
Gacaca.98  The participants of the Urugwiro Meetings included 
members of the government, state institutions, the military, 
political parties, and the judiciary.99  Participation by civil 
societies was limited however, as the only groups whose opinions 
were sought were victims‘ associations.100  Following these 
meetings, the government officially proposed to modernize and 
formalize the traditional Gacaca system to address the large 
number of prisoners.101  The use of Gacaca as a prong of the 
country‘s transitional justice system was thus discussed with 
certain members of the public before its official adoption. 
The Government of Rwanda gave the public a large role in the 
selection of which people would implement the traditional justice 
system.  Indeed, in keeping with accepted custom regarding the 
Gacaca courts, the judges are elected from among the local 
population over which they have jurisdiction.  Thus judges at the 
―Cell‖ level, Rwanda‘s lowest administrative level, are elected by 
the General Assembly of the Cell, which is made up of all Cell 
residents over eighteen years of age.102  Judges at the ―Sector‖ 
level, which comprises a larger area, are elected by the 
representative members of each Cell found within that particular 
Sector.103  The judges are elected based on their ―integrity.‖104  
Additionally, during the information collection phase of the 
 
 97 Id. at 36. 
 98 Id. at 37.  At that time, there were approximately 130,000 prisoners being 
held for genocide-related crimes and the Rwandan court system was 
overwhelmed. Id. 
 99 Id. at 46. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 37. 
 102 Organic Law No. 16/2004, arts. 13, 6 (June 19, 2004) (Rwanda), available 
at http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/newlaw1.pdf (establishing the 
Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with 
Prosecuting and Trying the Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other 
Crimes Against Humanity, Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 
31, 1994). 
 103 Id. arts. 13, 7. 
 104 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 46. 
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Gacaca process, which is held at the Cell level, residents of the 
Cell may offer information relating to an accused perpetrator.105  
The judge will consider such inform-ation in determining the 
―category‖ of the perpetrator‘s crimes.106 
The Government of Rwanda also sought to improve the 
transitional justice system through pilot programs and building 
on public feedback prior to its full-scale implementation.  In 2002, 
the Government conducted pilot Gacaca courts in 751 localities, 
approximately three years before the new Gacaca court system 
was implemented nationwide, finding that several modifications 
to the new Gacaca court system were advisable during that 
process.107 
In Timor-Leste, a smaller scale grass roots traditional justice 
mechanism, the Community Reconciliation Process (the ―CRP‖), 
was launched with the aim of promoting reconciliation among 
affected communities.108  The aim of the CRP was to ―reintegrate 
people who had become estranged from their communities by 
committing politically-related, ‗less serious‘ harmful acts during 
the political conflicts in Timor-Leste.‖109  The CRPs mandate was 
to facilitate community-based hearings where the community 
would participate directly in finding a way to reintegrate the 
perpetrators into the community.  The hearings were voluntary 
and were led by a panel of local leaders in the community affected 
by the acts of the perpetrator.  At the conclusion of the hearings, 
the panel would broker an agreement with the perpetrator to 
return to the community in exchange for the perpetrator‘s promise 
to provide community service or other similar tasks.110 While CRP 
provided for the basic structure of these community hearings, this 
 
 105 Id. at 42; see also National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, 
http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/En/EnStructure.htm. 
 106 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 42.  Gacaca courts place offenders in one of 
three categories based on their alleged violations.  Gacaca courts have 
jurisdiction over categories two and three, but offenders falling within the first 
category must be tried by ordinary courts.  The first category includes the most 
heinous and high profile actors, and their accomplices.  See Organic Law No. 
16/2004, arts. 2, 51 (June 19, 2004) (Rwanda). 
 107 Ingelaere, supra note 34, at 38-42. 
 108 East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, The 
Community Reconciliation Process, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/recon 
ciliation.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
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structure was flexible, allowing each jurisdiction to vary the 
proceedings as they saw fit.111 
3. Nationally Mandated TRCs 
During the third wave of transitional justice, the public came 
to play an increasingly large role in the establishment of TRCs, 
and, in particular, in deciding whether a TRC should be created 
and how such a body should operate.  Indeed, governments have 
to a greater degree encouraged the public to be involved in 
drafting the legislation establishing the TRC, which includes 
determining the composition and operation of the commission.  In 
addition, the local population can play a role in raising funds and 
promoting outreach to expatriates.  The experiences of Timor-
Leste, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are pertinent examples of 
this shift in the establishment of TRCs and illustrate how 
national and international NGOs work together to contribute to 
the process. 
a. Timor Leste 
Timor-Leste included NGOs in the entire CAVR planning 
process.  The Government of Timor-Leste, supported by UNTAET, 
held a meeting in June 2000 to discuss transitional justice, 
including whether a truth commission should be established.112  
The meeting included various civil society groups, community 
leaders, and the Catholic Church.113  It resulted in a 
recommendation to the National Council of Timorese Resistance 
to create an independent commission that would have ―a mandate 
to investigate past violations and promote reconciliation.‖114  This 
Council acted upon the recommendation quickly and created a 
―steering committee‖ which was to determine the details of the 
TRC.115 
The steering committee in charge of determining what the 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 East Timor Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, 
Formation of the Commission, http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/en/cavr.htm 
[hereinafter Formation of the Commission]. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
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TRC would look like included representatives of various national 
and international NGOs.116  The steering committee conducted 
consultations in all thirteen districts of Timor-Leste from 
September 2000 through January 2001.  These included 
consultations with political parties, jurists, human rights 
organizations and victims‘ groups to assess the public‘s views on 
what such a body should look like, as well as public meetings at 
the district, sub-district, and village levels.117  The consultations 
had a built-in educational and feedback system enabling the 
steering committee to describe the type of institution the TRC 
would be while allowing the community members to provide 
feedback.118  Additionally, the CAVR solicited community leaders 
to endorse the procedures and incorporated small elements of 
traditional ceremony into the procedures to enhance acceptance of 
this mechanism by the community leaders.119 
b. Peru 
In Peru, the legislation creating the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, the ―CVR‖), 
was drafted by a working group composed of representatives from 
the government and civil society, including the ministries of 
justice, defense, interior, women‘s issues and human development, 
the human rights ombudsman‘s office, the National Human 
Rights Coordination, the Peruvian Episcopal Conference and the 
National Evangelical Council of Peru.120  The Commission worked 
 
 116 National NGOs included women‘s groups, youth organizations, the 
Catholic Church, the Association of ex-Political Prisoners, Falintil (the group 
that would become the army of Timor-Leste), while international NGOs included 
the UNTAET, and the UN High Commissioner on Refugees. Id. 
 117 Formation of the Commission, supra note 112. 
 118 Id.  This focus on education continued after the establishment of the TRC 
as well.  To educate the public about the truth and reconciliation process and to 
assist in the public‘s education about community reconciliation procedures, 
CAVR distributed video CDs as it toured the districts of Timor-Leste and 
conducted its operations.  PIERS PIGOU, THE COMMUNITY RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
OF THE COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH, AND RECONCILIATION 17, 22 (2004), 
http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/Analysis/Laporan Piers tentangCRP.pdf. 
 119 Id. at 30-31. 
 120 Sup. Res. No. 314-2000-JUS, Feb. 27, 2001 (Peru), translation available at 
http://190.41.250.173/rij/bases/legisla/peru/304-2000.html; WORLDWIDE TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS, MINISTRY OF NEPAL PEACE SECRETARIAT, 
http://www.peace.gov.np/admin/doc/World%20exper iances%20of%20TRC-
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with the International Center for Transitional Justice which 
allowed for consultation with other TRCs around the world in 
order to gather input on design, methodology and other similar 
details.121 
c. Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, various civil society groups were involved in 
the creation and establishment of a TRC.122  The civil society 
groups involved in peace negotiations advocated for the 
establishment of a TRC and worked with the Office of the 
UNHCHR on preliminary issues regarding the TRC‘s 
establishment.123  Civil society also reviewed the draft terms for 
the TRC‘s statute prepared by the office of the UNHCHR.124 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group was 
subsequently established to make recommendations on the 
composition of the TRC.125  This resulted in a transparent process 
as the public nominated sixty-five commissioner candidates.126  A 
selection panel then made recommendations to a selection 
coordinator who recommended four of the finalists for 
appointment to the TRC. 127  Sierra Leoneans living abroad were 
 
Commissions.pdf. 
 121 International Center for Transitional Justice: Peru, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region2/617.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). This 
consultation with the public continued after the initial formation of the TRC.  To 
implement the recommendations of the TRC, the government created a National 
Council for Reconciliation which relied heavily on input from civil society.   
Outreach was crucial to the commission and they worked at gathering 
information throughout the country by setting up five regional offices throughout 
Peru.  The CVR also sought to educate the public and made sure their final 
report and recommendations were made publicly and were widely distributed.  
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH 
AND RECONCILIATION COMMITTEE OF PERU (2003), 
http://www.ictj.org/static/Americas/Peru/TRC.FinalReport.eng.pdf [hereinafter 
PERU TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT]. 
 122 SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, THE FINAL REPORT 
OF THE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE: SETTING UP THE 
COMMISSION 1, 49-77 (2007), http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-
Conflict/TRCVolume1.pdf [hereinafter SETTING UP THE COMMISSION]. 
 123 OSAA, supra note 44, at 37; SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122, 
at 49-77. 
 124 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 49-77. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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also included in the process and were able to nominate the 
commissioners for that state‘s TRC.128  Public input in the design 
of the TRC and in the selection of its commissioners allowed for 
increased national ownership of the institution, while still relying 
on international groups such as the ICTJ, for assistance in 
technical and other matters.129  Thus, the institution was given 
credibility not only for being a product of national civil society, but 
also for adhering to international standards. 
Education was also made a high priority.  The commission 
provided a grant to the International Human Rights Law Group 
and other NGOs to establish a public education and awareness 
campaign before the establishment of the TRC.130  This campaign 
used radio, television, songs, drama, and posters to educate the 
public, and it also relied on civil society groups to carry out the 
campaign.131  Other NGOs also conducted public education on the 
TRC with independent funding.132  Furthermore, public 
workshops and conferences were held with strong civil society 
engagement prior to the inception of the TRC.133 
d. Liberia 
In Liberia,134 the Transitional Justice Working Group (the 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 International Center for Transitional Justice, Sierra Leone, 
http://www.ictj.org/ en/where/region1/141.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 130 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122, at 49-77. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Ambassador, EU Presidency Statement - The Role of Civil Society in Post-
Conflict Peace-Building, delivered by Ambassador Richard Ryan to the Security 
Council (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_3605_fr.htm [hereinafter EU Presidency 
Statement]. 
 134 The Liberian civil war was initiated in 1989 by the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), an armed group led by Charles Taylor, challenging 
then-President Samuel Doe.  In 1990, a break-away faction from Taylor‘s NPFL 
captured and killed Doe and an interim Government of National Unity was 
formed, headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer.  In 1992, Taylor finally agreed to the 
formation of a transitional government.  Taylor was elected President of Liberia 
after a special election in 1997.  Between 1989 and 1996, more than 200,000 
Liberians lost their lives and a million others became refugees.  The conflict in 
Liberia continued until 2003, when President Taylor resigned and accepted an 
asylum offer from Nigeria.  A comprehensive peace agreement (the Accra Peace 
Agreement) was reached by the Liberian government, the rebels, political 
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―TJWG‖), a coalition of NGOs, worked closely with the UN 
Mission in Liberia and the ICTJ to provide input on the creation 
of the TRC.135  The act creating the TRC allowed the public, 
including those abroad, to nominate TRC commissioners, subject 
to a further vetting process by a selection panel.136  In 2005, the 
Liberian public nominated over 150 candidates for the TRC 
commissioners.137  The selection panel screened the 150 nominees 
and shortened the candidate list to fifteen.138  The commission 
also conducted a Nationwide Needs Assessment in May 2006 and 
later launched a Nationwide Outreach and Sensitization 
Campaign to introduce itself to the public prior to its launch.139  
The Liberian TRC commissioners conducted extensive public 
outreach within Liberia and amongst the Liberian community 
world-wide, calling for widespread participation from all members 
and former members of the society.140 
During the months prior to launching the TRC, the Liberian 
civil society, international NGOs, and the TRC commissioners 
conducted extensive educational campaigns.141  The TJWG 
 
parties, and civil society in 2003 in Accra, Ghana.  For more information, see 
United States Department of State, Background Note: Liberia, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); 
International Center for Transitional Justice, Liberia, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/589.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2010); the 
full text of the Peace Agreement is available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/liberia_0818
2003.pdf; United States Institute of Peace, Liberia, http://www.usip.org/ 
resources/truth-commission-liberia (last visited Sept. 8, 2009). 
 135 Liberia Launches Truth and Reconciliation Commission, INTERNATIONAL 
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, June 22, 2006, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/961.html [hereinafter Liberia, 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER]. 
 136 AMNESTY INT‘L, LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION: MEMORANDUM 
ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION ACT 26 (June 21, 2006), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/005/2006/en/3205abe5-d41f-
11dd-8743-d305bea2b2c7/afr340052006en.pdf [hereinafter LIBERIA: TRUTH, 
JUSTICE AND REPARATION]. 
 137 Id. at 27. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Massa A. Washington, Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commissioner 
of Liberia Commission on Diaspora Relations, Remarks at the Official Launching 
of the TRC-US Diaspora Statement Taking Process, available at 
https://www.trcofliberia.org/news-1/trc-happenings/remaks-at-the-official-
launching-of-the-trc-us-diaspora-statement-taking-process. 
 140 Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135. 
 141 LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 30-31. 
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conducted a public education and awareness campaign, including 
meetings in four Liberian counties to obtain public feedback on 
the TRC.142  In May 2006, the TJWG and ICTJ organized a 
consultation session to outline the role of civil society groups in 
the truth and reconciliation process.143  Approximately fifty civil 
society representatives from all counties in Liberia attended this 
session.144  The ICTJ also helped organize workshops to train the 
local media groups about the TRC.145 
III. EMERGING BEST PRACTICE 
The foregoing analysis of the creation of transitional justice 
mechanisms demonstrates that, when determining the types of 
mechanisms to use and procedures to follow, states have 
increasingly found it advisable to engage in direct communication 
with the public at the outset.  Such public outreach during the 
planning phase can be beneficial in multiple ways.  First, 
feedback received from the public can assist the state in creating a 
transitional justice system that better responds to local needs.  
The success of the Gacaca system in Rwanda, for example, is due 
in part to its responsiveness to public feedback before its 
nationwide launch.  Second, input from the public can assist in 
creating a fairer system, taking into account the many actors and 
perspectives involved in the conflict.  This in turn will help 
increase the chances of successful reconciliation.146  Third, the 
public is more likely to support a transitional justice system if it is 
familiar with the system and was instrumental in its creation.147  
 
 142 Id. at 30 
 143 Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See, e.g., Anna F. Triponel, Can the Iraqi Special Tribunal Further 
Reconciliation in Iraq?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 277 (2007) 
(demonstrating that reconciliation is not achieved when transitional justice is 
viewed as one-sided). 
 147 See, e.g., id.; LOUIS AUCOIN & EILEEN F. BABBITT, UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, STRATEGIC GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
ACTIVITIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2007), http://www.undp.org.rs/ 
index.cfm?event=public.getFile&fileid=06FC4932-3FF2-8C75-
2EA1D3F9F50CDCBC; African Transitional Justice Research Network, ATJRN 
Capacity Building Workshops, http://www.transitionaljustice.org.za/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=466&Itemid=40 (last visited Feb. 
13, 2010). 
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Conversely, if the public is not consulted, this can lead to lack of 
integrity, as with the Sierra Leone High Court where it was 
believed that many misperceptions and resentments ―could easily 
have been prevented if there had been more consultation from the 
outset.‖148 
At the same time, public participation in a country emerging 
from conflict on issues as sensitive as torture, disappearances and 
mass murder is difficult.  There is a need to address conflict 
expeditiously while at the same time ensure feedback from the 
most representative group possible.  The evolution of practices 
over the three waves of transitional justice illustrates the key 
factors which should be considered when incorporating public 
participation in the planning phases of transitional justice. 
A. Consulted Issues 
Depending on the particular transitional justice system 
implemented, the government or the UN may consult with the 
public on a range of issues.  For example, the public could be 
asked whether the particular transitional justice mechanism 
proposed should be adopted.  This has happened in connection 
with a number of the recently formed TRCs, such as in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia. 
The public can also be asked to provide input in drafting the 
implementing legislation for the transitional justice mechanisms.  
This includes determining the personnel and procedures for such 
mechanisms.  In addition, the government can encourage 
individual citizens or non-governmental organizations to generate 
support among the general population for the mechanism, 
including raising funds.  The government can also seek to educate 
the public, keep the public abreast of the latest developments 
regarding the implementation of the transitional justice 
mechanism, and convey what the government hopes to achieve. 
Experience demonstrates that when civil society is present at 
the beginning of the process, it will generally remain involved 
throughout the process.  For example, in Liberia, the TJWG, 
representing various groups in civil society, was involved in 
making the decision as to whether transitional justice 
mechanisms were needed and subsequently provided input on the 
 
 148 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 11. 
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drafting of the TRC act, planning for the TRC‘s operations, and 
selecting TRC commissioners. 149 
B. Meaningful Participation 
The UNHCHR has commented on the need for meaningful 
participation, indicating that  ―effective outreach should involve‖ 
four elements:150  first, ―[a] proactive strategy that seeks to target 
different sectors of the population (women‘s groups, 
schoolchildren, the legal profession, the security sector, private 
business, etc.);‖151 second, ―[a] comprehensive approach that 
focuses not just on the prosecutor, who will always attract much 
public attention at the beginning of the proceedings, but on all 
parts of the trial process, including the right to a fair trial and 
competent defence, this should include the provision and 
dissemination of preliminary basic information as early as 
possible[];‖152 third, ―[a] network that is able to disseminate 
accurate information quickly over a wide geographic area;‖153  and 
fourth, ―[g]enuine, two-way communication that involves dialogue 
and opportunities for feedback.‖154 
The evolution of transitional justice mechanisms in the past 
three decades demonstrate that, when determining the best 
strategy for meaningful public participation, there are three key 
questions to be resolved: who, how and when? 
1. Who: Consulting Representative Groups 
Public participation is rendered meaningless if the people 
who participate are not sufficiently representative of the local 
population.155  The modalities for seeking true representation will 
 
 149 Id., see also AMNESTY INT‘L, LIBERIA: TOWARDS THE FINAL PHASE OF THE 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1-36 (2008), available at http://www. 
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR34/002/2008/en/f98485d1-571e-11dd-90eb-
ff4596860802/afr340022008eng.pdf. 
 150 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 20. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 11 (indicating that ―[i]ntimately connected with the question of 
ownership is that of identifying interlocutors. The range of interlocutors with 
whom the international community seeks to engage during the negotiation on 
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vary depending on the country and conflict.  Nevertheless, a 
number of trends have emerged as best practice. 
First, when high courts or hybrid courts are created by the 
UN, the UN‘s in-country planning missions should focus on 
ensuring ownership of the process by the national government.  
For example, the ICTJ recommends ―that the mission team ha[ve] 
a specific national liaison identified from within the government 
of the potential host country with whom to ensure effective 
coordination.‖156  The planning mission should address ―[t]he 
presence and organisational capacity of civil society, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), both national and 
international, and human rights groups.‖157  The Office of the 
UNHCHR recommends ―clear assessment of the national capacity, 
with the participation of human resource experts‖ and that these 
assessments teams ―not only be led by a UN actor with detailed 
knowledge of the country but also include national legal actors.‖158  
Key players to involve during this planning mission include 
relevant ministries as well as civil society.159 
Second, there is a need to focus on the sectors of society that 
were particularly affected by the conflict.  This includes not only 
the victims of the conflict but also the perpetrators.  For example, 
in Sierra Leone, child soldiers were both victims and perpetrators 
of violations, and their views on how to best achieve justice and 
reconciliation were considered particularly important.160  This was 
 
the formation of a hybrid court plays an important role in securing buy-in from 
stakeholders in civil society and the legal community. As a result, this range 
should be wide and include major stakeholders.‖).  For example, in Nepal, NGOs 
including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urged the 
government of Nepal ―to involve actively all those concerned in the discussions 
on the establishment, mandate, and powers of the Disappearances Commission 
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.‖  Nepal: Human Rights Bill, 
supra note 16. 
 156 ROBIN VINCENT, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES MANUAL FOR INTERNATIONALLY ASSISTED CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS 4 (2007), http://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/3/931. pdf. 
 157 Id. at 5. 
 158 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 9. 
 159 VINCENT, supra note 157, at 6. 
 160 NATALIE MANN AND BERT THEUERMANN, UNICEF, CHILDREN AND THE 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR SIERRA LEONE: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR INVOLVING 
CHILDREN IN THE TRC 1 (2001), http://www.unrol.org/files/TruthandRecon 
ciliationSierraLeone.pdf (stating that in Sierra Leone, ―[c]hildren‘s experiences 
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taken into account in the TRC act which called ―on the TRC to 
give special attention to the experiences of children within the 
armed conflict . . . and, to this end, to consider implementing 
special procedures to address the needs of children who have been 
victims, or perpetrators of violations . . . .‖161  Another example is 
Sierra Leone, where surveys of ex-combatants were organized by 
a national NGO in coordination with the ICTJ.162 
Third, national civil society should be encouraged to convey 
the views of locals on the ground.  If the national NGO is intended 
to reflect views from a specific part of the population, then a 
number of NGOs representing different parts of the populace 
should be consulted.  If the national NGO purports to represent 
views of the community as a whole, the mechanisms they employ 
to speak in the name of the population should be explored.  
International civil society can also play a role, especially with 
regard to sharing expertise regarding public participation 
mechanisms that have been successful in other countries. 
Fourth, professionals with specific expertise should be 
targeted.  These can include members of the legal community, 
human rights campaigners, and other specific professions.  
However, while the 2002 UN planning missions in Sierra Leone 
included representatives of civil society and human rights NGOs, 
the national groups still felt left out.  This experience 
demonstrates the difficulty of ensuring that all constituents feel 
involved in the process. 
Fifth, to ensure true representation, different regional 
viewpoints should also be taken into account.  The atrocities will 
not have had the same impact in all parts of the country.  For 
example, in Liberia, meetings took place in four Liberian counties 
to obtain the public‘s feedback on the TRC, and civil society 
representatives from all the counties in Liberia attended a 
consultation session to outline the role of civil society groups in 
 
should form an integral part throughout the TRC process - from the preparatory 
phase and the undertaking of preliminary background research to the final 
report and the establishment of a follow-up committee.‖). 
 161 Id. (stating that in Sierra Leone, ―[c]hildren‘s experiences should form an 
integral part throughout the TRC process - from the preparatory phase and the 
undertaking of preliminary background research to the final report and the 
establishment of a follow-up committee.‖). 
 162 PRIDE, supra note 92, at 36-39; Perriello & Wierda, supra note 43, at 36. 
33
 136 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol.  22:1 
the truth and reconciliation process.163  In Peru, the CVR set up 
five regional offices to promote participation from affected groups 
throughout the country.164  Several TRCs have also focused efforts 
on including expatriates in the reconciliation process. 
2. How: Methods of Participation 
In the past, either the UN or the government has 
spearheaded the public participation process, depending on who is 
the primary entity responsible for its creation.  In addition, before 
it actually starts its operations, the court or TRC in question can 
be responsible for obtaining feedback from the public.165  The 
government can also train other actors to play a role, such as local 
media or local NGOs, which has the added benefit of enhancing 
national ownership. 
a. Transparency 
It is important that consultations with the public be 
transparent and that the process be made public.  For example, 
the establishment of the TRC in Sierra Leone was deemed by the 
international community to be a transparent process.166 
b. Education 
Recent trends in the establishment of both TRCs and 
tribunals show education as a fundamental element of outreach.  
For example, for criminal trials to play an important role in 
transitioning societies, former UN Secretary General commented 
that they must ―giv[e] [victims] a chance to see their former 
tormentors made to answer for their crimes.‖167  In Cambodia, 
 
 163 LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 30. 
 164 PERU TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION REPORT, supra note 121. 
 165 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (―While NGOs can play a crucial role 
in amplifying awareness and encouraging debate about hybrid courts, this 
should not in turn justify a reduction of the hybrid court‘s own responsibility for 
outreach. Outreach needs to be complemented by public information and by a 
trained media adviser and spokesperson. Public information offices of hybrid 
tribunals can contribute to building the capacity and legal literacy of local media, 
including through working with NGOs.‖). 
 166 EU Presidency Statement, supra note 134. 
 167 Transitional Justice Report, supra note 25. 
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DC-CAM played a key role in involving and educating the public 
about the trials.  Furthermore, organizations such as ICTJ have 
engaged in the capacity of building among local organizations, to 
allow them to better monitor the proceedings and distribute the 
information.168  In Sierra-Leone, there was an attempt to educate 
local leaders and ex-combatants in hopes that they would spread 
information and also increase their willingness to cooperate with 
the courts.169 
In Timor-Leste, before the CAVR was established, a steering 
committee underwent various consultations throughout the 
country to determine what kind of TRC would be best suited to 
the needs of the people.170  These consultations incorporated an 
educational and feedback mechanism, whereby the public being 
consulted would learn about the various TRC mechanisms and 
provide feedback as to what their community felt was 
necessary.171  Both Sierra Leone and Liberia also launched 
education and public awareness campaigns prior to the 
establishment of their TRCs.172 
Educating the public allows not only for a mode of cultivating 
public feedback, but also provides a way to nationalize the process 
of reconciliation.  If transitional justice mechanisms are viewed as 
having been imposed from the outside, their effectiveness to 
create change will be diminished. 
c. Feedback Mechanisms 
The example of Cambodia, where civil society groups 
complained that the UN consultations tended to be limited to 
educational sessions, demonstrates the importance of feedback 
mechanisms to take into account the public‘s concerns and 
comments.173  There are many different ways for obtaining 
feedback from the population on specific questions, including 
surveys of victims, group discussions, workshops, and through 
soliciting written submissions.  Educational campaigns to educate 
 
 168 ICTJ, Cambodia, supra note 54. 
 169 Perriello & Wierde, supra note 43; PRIDE, supra note 92. 
 170 CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49. 
 171 Id. 
 172 See SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122; LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE 
AND REPARATION, supra note 136. 
 173 MUDDELL, supra note 84, at 6-7. 
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the public in parallel can include radio, television, songs, drama 
and posters, as was done in Sierra Leone.174  Past practices 
demonstrate that one way to obtain feedback from a number of 
groups is by creating a specific working group whose mandate is 
to provide input into the work of the transitional justice 
mechanism.  In Liberia, NGOs came together to create the TJWG 
to provide input on the creation of the TRC175 while in Sierra 
Leone, NGOs established a TRC Working Group that made 
recommendations on the composition of the Commission.176 
d. Public Funding 
In most cases, transitional justice mechanisms have been 
funded either by the state that created them or, if the mechanism 
was created internationally, by a number of foreign contributors.  
Allowing the public to assist in the funding of these mechanisms, 
however, could increase the sense among the public that the 
institution is their own, rather than a system imposed from the 
outside.  For example, the act establishing the TRC in Liberia 
allowed the TRC to be financed by different sources including 
individual Liberians and non-Liberians, as well as international 
non-governmental organizations.177 
3. When: Providing for Timely Input 
Meaningful participation also means providing sufficient time 
for the public to provide feedback.  This is very closely linked with 
the feedback mechanisms and can have serious effects on 
nationalizing the transitional justice process.  If processes such as 
surveys or educational consultations are in place, the public 
should be given enough time to respond, and those in charge of 
collecting this input should be given significant time to analyze 
and incorporate the results. 
Many countries have employed working groups whose 
mandate it is to gather and analyze public input before the 
creation of a TRC.  Implicit in this mandate is that these 
 
 174 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122. 
 175 Liberia, INTERNATIONAL CENTER, supra note 135. 
 176 SETTING UP THE COMMISSION, supra note 122. 
 177 LIBERIA: TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION, supra note 136, at 31-32. 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/3
   
2010] PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  139 
consultations will help inform the working group‘s decisions as to 
the makeup or structure of the TRC.  It is important that enough 
time be given to the working group.  In Timor Leste, the working 
group was given five months, enabling it to gather information 
from each of its thirteen districts, as well as sub-districts and 
villages.178  In Peru, the working group had three months and was 
composed of a large cross section of civil society in order to obtain 
well rounded input in creating its TRC.179 
C. Varying Consultation Depending on the Transitional Justice 
Mechanism 
This analysis of the degree of public participation in the 
varying transitional justice mechanisms highlights that the 
nature of the public consultation depends on the type of 
transitional justice system being implemented.  Consultations 
regarding the early high courts tended to be limited to educational 
sessions, while hybrid tribunals have come to rely more on public 
input with regards to the design of the tribunal.  TRCs have also 
increased their reliance on public input, including on the question 
of whether a TRC should be created at all. 
These differences in the nature of the consultation process 
can be explained by a number of factors.  TRC‘s aim is first and 
foremost to promote national reconciliation and to establish a 
balanced picture of the conflict.  A TRC may not be appropriate for 
every transition and this is a decision that should belong to those 
who have lived through the conflict.180  The international 
community may assist in providing information and expertise 
based on other TRCs but cannot force such decisions.181  Trials on 
the other hand seek to achieve justice which, to a certain degree, 
should be achieved whether or not all nationals agree.  The 
 
 178 CHEGA! FINAL REPORT, supra note 49. 
 179 Sup. Res. No. 304-2000-JUS, Dec. 9, 2000 (Peru), translation available at 
http://190.41.250.173/rij/bases/legisla/peru/304-2000.html. 
 180 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
RULE-OF-LAW TOOLS FOR POST-CONFLICT STATES: TRUTH COMMISSIONS 5 (2006), 
available at http://www.unrol.org/files/ruleoflaw-TruthCommissions_ en.pdf 
[hereinafter TRUTH COMMISSIONS]. 
 181 Id. (indicating that ―International actors . . . should recognize from the 
start that a country may choose, for very legitimate reasons, not to have a truth 
commission or at least not to have one immediately upon transition. National 
views on this matter should be respected.‖). 
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resemblance of hybrid tribunals to domestic criminal proceedings 
for which public participation does not play a part, explains in 
part why, during the initial hybrid tribunals, public participation 
has not always been seen as crucial.182  In addition, although the 
design of court systems varies, there are a number of procedural 
and substantive similarities among tribunals.183  This is not true 
however of TRCs which should be unique to each conflict.184  
Indeed, the Office of the UNHCHR has emphasized that ―[u]nlike 
courts, for which there are clear international norms regarding 
their appropriate structure, components, powers and minimal 
standards for proceedings, truth commissions will reasonably 
differ between countries in many aspects.‖185 
Today, however, it is increasingly clear that when a hybrid 
tribunal is created, consultation with the local population in 
addition to negotiations with the government is required to 
achieve an appropriate balance between the national and 
international elements of the tribunal.  The populace should feel 
that the tribunal belongs to them, with an international presence, 
rather than being imposed from the outside.186  This public 
consultation at the outset can help avoid misunderstandings and 
assess the importance of particular factors for the population.  For 
example, the Government of Sierra Leone amended the 
implementing legislation for the court to appoint international 
staff instead of nationals to some of the key posts in the court, 
which led to the view that the court was more international than 
national.187  In addition, because the population is not involved in 
 
 182 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 19 (―In part, this [lack of consultation] 
has been due to a general reluctance, including on the part of legal professionals 
within hybrid tribunals, to view the trial processes of hybrid courts as inherently 
different from domestic criminal proceedings.‖). 
 183 See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 
(May 25, 1993); Rome Statute, supra note 40. 
 184 TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 180, at 5-6. 
 185 Id. at 1. 
 186 HYBRID COURTS, supra note 6, at 9 (―By definition, hybrid approaches 
require investment from both international and national organizations, 
Governments, victim organizations, legal communities, and civil society. Ideally, 
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overall is greater; however, very few Sierra Leoneans are in positions of 
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the operation of a tribunal to the same degree as they are in a 
TRC, it is especially important that a mechanism be put in place 
at the outset to consult with the public. Tribunals often tackle 
complex international criminal law issues that are difficult for the 
public to understand.  This problem is exacerbated in countries 
with low literacy levels.188  As such, outreach during the creation 
of hybrid tribunals will help introduce the public to the workings 
of the tribunal and involve victims and other stakeholders.189  The 
Iraqi Special Tribunal is an example of a tribunal that was viewed 
as somewhat biased and, accordingly, did not fulfill its potential 
relating to reconciliation.190 
In addition, unlike the early high court tribunals, such as the 
ICTR and ICTY that were located outside of the country in 
transition,191 many hybrid courts now insist that the tribunal be 
established within the country.  This was seen in the ECCC and 
the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone which were both set up 
within the national borders of the transitioning country.  The UN 
Secretary General has commented that ―there are a number of 
important benefits to locating tribunals inside the countries 
concerned, including easier interaction with the local population, 
closer proximity to the evidence and witnesses and being more 
accessible to victims.‖192  As such, establishing transitional 
mechanisms locally, including hybrid courts, has emerged as good 
practice. 
CONCLUSION 
This article demonstrates that the public outreach 
 
authority or participate in high-level decision-making.‖). 
 188 Id. at 19. 
 189 Id. at 18-19 (―Outreach [during the creation of hybrid tribunals] may be 
the main way of involving victims and other stakeholders, who may not 
otherwise be able to participate more formally in the trials. A hybrid court may 
be seen as largely irrelevant unless there is a robust outreach programme that 
informs the public about its activities.‖). 
 190 Triponel, supra note 146. 
 191 For the ICTY, see Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 
2 of Security Council Resolution 808, S.C. Res. 820, 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f21b10.html; for the ICTR, see S.C. Res. 
977, 3502d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995), available at 
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mechanisms used by a country and the UN during the 
establishment of a transitional justice system will depend on the 
specific circumstances of each country.  Nevertheless, early and 
comprehensive public outreach is increasingly viewed as crucial in 
helping the state achieve its objective of creating a successful 
transitional justice system inclusive of all perspectives of the 
conflict and accepted by the population at large.  The need to 
obtain public feedback at the outset is especially important in 
view of the current trend towards the establishment of hybrid 
courts with increased national elements and national TRCs 
focused on reconciliation. 
The experience of various transitioning countries throughout 
the first, second, and third waves provides a lesson to those 
countries who now find themselves in similar circumstances.  
Experience shows that in designing a transitional justice system 
that incorporates feedback from the public, the system ultimately 
has a better chance of achieving its aim of justice for victims, 
while reinforcing the possibility of peace, reconciliation, and social 
reconstruction.  Countries now emerging from a conflict could 
learn from the experience of countries before them. 
Integrating public input into a transitional justice system will 
have major benefits for the country as a whole and the converse is 
also true.  Kenya‘s recent creation of the Truth, Justice, 
Reconciliation Committee (―TJRC‖) highlights this point.  When 
the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights was consulted 
regarding setting up the TJRC, the short timelines set for 
consultation did not enable this commission to consult properly 
with its constituencies.193  In addition, the Bill on Special 
Tribunals appeared in that country‘s Gazette for two weeks of 
public debate after discussions between the Ministry of Justice 
and the Attorney-General, by which time, changes were 
unlikely.194  Kenya‘s experience accordingly demonstrates that 
―meaningful public input must take place before the tabling of 
Bills in Parliament, and that a special duty is imposed upon 
government to ensure that this happens.‖195  The head of the 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights has, for example, 
stated that ―public participation improves lawmaking while giving 
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citizens a stake in it.  By inviting participation, lawmakers not 
only gather important information on which to make better laws, 
they also express their respect for the citizens whom they consult.  
In turn, those consulted become more engaged and responsible in 
public life.‖196 
Although the initial burden is on the organization and state 
that are creating the transitional justice mechanism, the local 
population plays a key role in ensuring true representation.  Civil 
society should view this as an opportunity to organize.  In Nepal, 
for instance, in order to provide for meaningful public 
participation, the ICTJ and Advocacy Forum (―AF‖) conducted a 
survey of victims from seventeen regions in Nepal, followed by 
focus-group discussions regarding the possible implementation of 
a TRC.  This resulted in the recommendation from the ICTJ and 
AF that ―an official joint task force on transitional justice 
comprising representatives from the government, civil society, 
National Human Rights Commission, victims, and the UN‖ be 
created to ―conduct broad-based national consultations on the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and to gather stakeholders‘ 
views on the Commission‘s mandate, powers, goals, and 
timeframe.‖197 
Lessons extracted from the three waves of transitional justice 
are not only useful for the countries emerging from conflict, but 
also for those who have established transitional justice 
mechanisms without adequate public consultation.  Mechanisms 
that were historically put in place without initial public 
participation are now focusing on incorporating consultation 
programs.  For example, in Rwanda, the Rwandan Government 
did not appear to have consulted with the public about the 
creation of the NURC, but since its commencement, the NURC 
has conducted extensive outreach programs.  These programs 
include meetings, conferences, workshops, consultations, and 
sensitization campaigns on the theme of unity and 
reconciliation.198  The Rwandan Government organized the 
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Ingando solidarity camps for reintegration and re-education.199  It 
also held a number of national summits which both current and 
expatriate Rwandans attended.200  Similarly, the Bosnia War 
Crimes Chamber and the Rwandan Gacaca system were both 
mechanisms used to take ownership of their transitional justice 
systems and to build on shortcomings of their respective ad hoc 
tribunals. 
When the public is involved in the threshold question as to 
whether a particular court or commission should be created at all, 
it is easier to secure the public‘s participation in the subsequent 
design and operation of the system that is adopted.  Although this 
article focuses on public participation at the outset, participation 
does not, and should not, end with the creation of the transitional 
justice mechanism.  Ownership should be viewed as a continuum 
and activities promoting both participation and education should 
be conducted throughout a tribunal‘s existence. Only through 
meaningful public participation and ownership of the various 
transitional justice mechanisms available will the goal of 
reconciliation be truly felt. 
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